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Abstract—Power system state estimation is a prerequisite for
detecting faults, directing power flows, and other tasks of En-
ergy Management Systems. State estimators have conventionally
filtered out so-called bad data or outliers, but in recent years
a number of attacks and mitigation mechanisms have been
proposed involving deliberate injection of bad data.
In this paper, we introduce a constrained attack mechanism
which will be feasible where the communication channel for mea-
surements is authenticated and integrity-protected. We demon-
strate that re-ordering of measurements is sufficient to cause
errors in state estimation or preventing convergence and propose
an algorithm to introduce such attacks.
Based on this, we introduce two security metrics to quantify
the effort required for sparse and minimum magnitude re-
ordering attacks, respectively, in the form of security indices
based on the assumption of the adversary’s full or partial
knowledge of previous measurement vectors. We demonstrate
success by presenting the Mean Square Error (MSE) for the
attacks described and also evaluate the attack model for both
the standard IEEE-14 and 30-bus test cases.
Index Terms: Power system, re-ordering attacks, state
estimation, stealthy/ hidden attack
I. INTRODUCTION
State estimation has been at the core of monitoring and
managing power networks for decades, but is increasing in im-
portance in the transition to smart grids. Sensors are becoming
more sophisticated as in the case of more widespread adoption
of phasor measurement units (PMUs) and relatively inexpen-
sive micro-PMUs as well as more conventional monitoring
by way of Intelligent Electronic Devices (IEDs) [1]. State
estimation relies on these measurements and topology analysis
and is in turn a key input for any Energy Management system
operating a power grid and performing contingency analysis
[2]. Measurements may, however, be faulty, but can also be
the subject to attacks, either on sensors or on communication
channels. For the former case statistical detection algorithms
have long formed part of state estimation, but the latter has
only come to the attention of the research community in
recent years. A number of attacks have been proposed ranging
from the manipulation of measurements as may be achievable
by direct manipulation of sensors to indirect attacks such
as manipulating the signal timing proposed by Shepard and
Humphreys [3], jamming of signals proposed by Deka et al.
[4] or delays in communication channels proposed by Baiocco
et al. [5]. Unlike the work mentioned before, most attacks,
however, rely on the assumption that arbitrary values may
be injected by an adversary. We argue that this may not be
a realistic assumption and that instead it is of considerable
interest to study cases where measurements and communi-
cation channels are protected, at least using authentication
and integrity protection as provided e.g. by the ISO/IEC
62351 standard. This offers a more realistic adversary model
compared to that introduced by Liu et al. [6].
The main aim of this work is to highlight the vulnerabilities
in the existing communication infrastructure by introducing a
novel attack relying solely on re-ordering of the measurement
vector which result in spurious estimates. Here, we formulate
targeted re-ordering attack considering two scenarios for this:
1) swapping the measurements by the previous plausible vector
and 2) swapping the measurements by some scalar multiple
of previous measurement vector. It is worth noting that we
assume here that the preceding and present measurement
vectors are known to the attacker. Specifically, we prove that
for scenario I, if the attacker swaps more than 80% of total
measurements, it can cause the system to diverge as a result
of ill-conditioned Jacobian. Similarly, to execute attacks of the
kind as in scenario II, attackers have to pay more (swapping
of about 75% measurements will be required) to get maximum
mean square error in estimated states.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Back-
ground and related work are briefly described in section II and
a description of the system models used in state estimation,
bad-data detection and identification is presented in the section
III. The novel measurement re-ordering attack model and
algorithm are proposed in section IV along with the necessary
conditions to make the attack feasible. In section V, simulation
results are shown for the introduced attack on IEEE bus
systems. We discuss the significance and feasibility of the
proposed attack in section VI and finally, we offer concluding
remarks and suggest future work directions in section VII.
II. RELATED WORK
In [6], Liu et al. discussed the design and impacts of
undetectable false data injection attacks. These attacks,
constructed with projection matrices, proved to thwart the
bad data test. Based on the requirements such as topology,
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infrastructure and synchrophasor placement, various authors
tried to find the optimal solution to such attack problem.
Attacks that require minimum manipulation, called sparse
attacks are constructed in [7] in which, with the knowledge of
system topology, an attacker is able to find the set of meters
to inject bad data. Such attacks are also termed as least cost
attacks. Then, a greedy algorithm is proposed to evaluate
smallest set of measurements to be protected in order to force
the attacker to be detected. Following [7], Deka et. al defined
the adversary’s objective as constructing an attack vector
using minimum corruption to produce undetected error in
state estimation [8]. Difference between the two lies in using
graph theoretic ideas in [8] for finding optimal attack vector.
Data attack on strategic buses is proposed in [9] where a
polynomial time algorithm is given to identify the minimum
number of measurements to manipulate for a successful
stealthy attack on the desired buses. In [10], protection
from FDI attacks is proposed by securing a particular set of
measurements or by verifying the state variables individually
using greedy schemes.
The concept of security index was introduced by Sandberg
et al. in [11] and [12] by proposing two metrics. These indices
quantify the least effort needed to achieve attack goals while
avoiding bad-data alarms in the power network control center
[11]. These indices depend on the power network topology
and the measurements available to the system operator. The
information gained in terms of these metrics can be utilised
to strengthen the security of power grid. One of the indices is
for the sparse attacks and other for small magnitude attacks.
The inspiration of security metrics in the present paper is
drawn from their work [12] to quantify how hard re-ordering
attacks are to perform.
The majority of the current work on power grid security
has been focussed on designing stealthy or undetectable
attacks that inject bad data or modify the existing data
while avoiding detection completely. However, Kim et al.
in [13] proved that detectable data framing attacks can be
formulated that modify half of the total measurements and
damage the other half. Thus, the attack becomes successful
after the damaged measurements are detected and removed
by traditional bad-data test. This is the first work (to the
best of our knowledge) on the notion of detectable attacks.
Following this, in [4], a generalized detectable attack
model is presented where a particular set of measurements
are made protected/non-corruptable by authentication or
integrity protection. In [14], Deka et al. considered the same
framework as in [4] but with an inclusion of the concept of
jamming. It is worth noting here that measurement jamming
is less resource-intensive and in addition it only requires to
drop/block the readings rather than to modify or inject bad
data. The authors then presented in [15] a kind of attack
in which both jamming and changing the status of breaker
are combined to make the attack feasible. In this case, the
adversary changes the status of few closed breakers and
blocks the communication of flow measurements on those
lines to the control centre to make the attack stealthy.
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Figure 1: State estimation model and detection test
Later, Sanjab and Saad introduced the concept of multiple
adversaries and studied their impacts on power system [16].
It is possible that the adversaries may cancel the effect of
each other resulting in normal operating system i.e. no need
to mitigate/defend. On the other hand, it is quite likely that
the multiple attackers help each other in achieving malicious
goals and prove destructive for the grid. In addition, Game
theoretic approach is used to formulate the attack model with
multiple adversaries [17].
III. POWER SYSTEM STATE ESTIMATION
State estimator evaluates the most likely state of the system
by filtering and processing the measurements from Remote
Terminal Units (RTUs) or/and other metering devices installed
in the system via transmission lines. We denote the power
system by a graph with a set of V buses and E transmission
lines. We consider an AC power flow model for the network
[2]. It is given by
z = h(x) + e (1)
where z is the vector of measurements (m vector), x is the
state vector (n vector, and m > n), h is the measurement
function relating measurements to the states and e is the
vector of measurement errors having zero mean and known
co-variance, which is denoted by R. The errors are assumed
to be independent, therefore R is a diagonal matrix.
Cov(e) = R = diag{σ21 , σ22 , · · · , σ2m}
There are two well known methods to solve the state estima-
tion problem which are Weighted Least Square (WLS) and
Weighted Least Absolute Value (WLAV) method. Although,
WLAV is robust and stable in the sense that it is able to
reject bad data efficiently but it has some major drawbacks
i.e., it involves time consuming Linear Programming (LP)
technique, convergence rate reduces due to inclusion of aux-
iliary variables while minimizing and it is not reliable when
encountered with leverage points (i.e, ill-conditionality may
occur). Therefore, WLS, although not that effective in presence
of bad data, is considered as the most widely used method to
SE problems (for more details of WLAV, please see [18]). The
WLS problem involves solving a non-linear set of equations
relating measurements and state variables that are voltage
magnitudes and phase angles, by minimizing the summation
of squares of residuals as in [19]
J(x) =
m∑
i=1
(zi − hi(x))2/Rii = [z− h(x)]TR−1[z− h(x)]
Once the states (let us call them xˆ) are estimated, bad data
analysis is done by a statistical threshold τ
r = z− h(xˆ) (2)
Residual values larger than τ are detected and corresponding
measurements are flagged as bad and after their removal, state
estimation can be re-run until all the bad data are removed
and the system converges. There are other testing schemes as
well such as, χ2-test or hypothesis testing identification (HTI)
(Please see [2] for more details).
IV. ATTACK MODEL
The developments in the notion of attacks and their coun-
termeasures flourished much in the last decade. But as far
as mitigation/protection is concerned, the majority of the
work focussed integrity protection as one of the possible
countermeasures. The attack we are proposing is novel in the
sense that it can be launched successfully despite of these
modern restrictions. In section 3, a continuous model for state
estimation is presented, however, to study attacks and their
impacts, discrete approximation of the model is widely used
[2] and from now onwards we will also follow discrete time
approximation model.
z = Hx+ e (3)
where H ∈ Rm×n is a constant Jacobian matrix. Then the
estimation problem can be solved by
xˆ = (HTR−1H)−1HTR−1z (4)
The active power flows can be estimated by the phase angle
estimate xˆ
zˆ = Hxˆ = H(HTR−1H)−1HTR−1z := Kz (5)
where K is the hat matrix. Bad data detection system identify
faulty sensors and bad data by calculating the measurement
residue which is defined as
r := z− zˆ = z−Hxˆ = (I−K)z (6)
If the residue r is larger than the threshold τ , then an alarm is
triggered and bad measurements zi are identified and removed.
In case of False Data Injection (FDI), a generally denotes the
attack vector that shows the amount of change to the original
measurement vector [6].
a = Hc
where c is a vector denotes the magnitude of change and is
bounded by some stealthy condition. A necessary condition
for a stealthy FDI attack is that the bad data detection alarm
is not triggered if a lies in the null-space of I−K. Whereas,
in jamming or delay attacks, there is no attack vector to be
added, rather adversary just drop/block or jitter the measure-
ments irrespective of whether they are secure/protected or not
by hacking the communication infrastructure. Similarly, re-
ordering of the measurement vector is introduced where the
goal of the adversary is to misguide the system operators
about the type and strength of attack while keeping itself
hidden. By hidden, we mean an attack that is successful
in state forcing or non-convergence while being in-noticed
by the model-based bad data detection. There may be more
sophisticated detection criteria, of course, but these apply
mostly to determining whether measurement devices (vector
entries) are compromised, and that doesn’t apply here. Other
models rely on redundancy among measurements to determine
compromise, but for a network-based attack this does not
match very well.
Now, z∗ is the new measurement vector obtained after swap-
ping/ re-ordering the measurements
z∗ = z+ a
where a is the swapping attack vector. This attack is less
recourse intensive as it doesn’t require modification or bad data
injection into the sensors rather tampering the transmission
lines would be enough. After re-ordering, the system model is
z∗ = Hx∗ + e
where and x∗ is the corresponding state vector which can be
determined by
x∗ = (HTR−1H)−1HTR−1z∗ (7)
where H is the Jacobian matrix. As, the final result of the
state estimate from the above set of normal equations involves
matrix multiplication with z∗, therefore even the swapping
of just 2 readings will change the whole state vector. We
assume that all data is subjected to outlier removal which
is usually a residue test to filter bad data (see section III).
We have to show that the attack proposed below will not be
affected by this removal while satisfying stealth condition. To
make the swapping attack successful, attacker has to know the
previous plausible measurement vector (either partial or full).
As in [11], Sandberg et al., defined two security indices for
sparse attacks as well as for small magnitude attacks. The first
security index αk in [11] is for sparse attacks i.e. the adversary
can get the least/minimum cost attack by solving this and the
second security index βk help the attacker to find the small
magnitude false data injection attacks to avoid detection tests.
The aim of the attacker here is to maximize the impact P of
swapping i.e, in terms of convergence time and MSE while
keeping the measurement re-ordering to the minimum. This
optimization problem can be formulated as
min
ai
P s.t. ‖ ai ‖≤ µ (8)
where µ > 0 is the desired bound on the size of attack.
As defined, P = ∞ means that the state estimator does not
converge.
The two scenarios defined in section I are as follows:
A. Scenario I
Here, we consider the re-ordering of measurement with
some measurement vector from the plausible preceding data
sets. By plausible we mean that the difference between the
Figure 2: Attack on communication network
corresponding estimates is bounded i.e.,
| xnew − xold |< µ
where µ is some scalar. In other words, attacker is not free to
choose any previous data set for swapping attack but only the
one satisfying the above condition. Here, we are assuming that
a particular set of measurements is secured such that they are
integrity protected but not encrypted. By integrity protection
we mean, protection of content and processes against injection.
Assumptions regarding knowledge that attacker has, include:
1) Order (m × n)of Jacobian matrix H , 2) Arrangement
in which the measurements are placed in H and 3) Set of
protected measurements is also known to the adversary.
Once the data set to be used in the attack is chosen, the man-
in-the-middle attacker now has to select which readings to
swap between the two measurement vectors, and which not
i.e restricted swapping. This means the attacker can launch
minimum cost/sparse attacks with carefully chosen minimum
possible swapping. For this purpose, we define a measure to
quantify the hardness to perform sparse swapping attacks.
minimize ‖znewi − zoldi ‖0
subject to |znewi − zoldi | < 
(9)
where 0-norm of a vector v is ‖vi‖0 is the number of non-
zero entries in vi, solution to (9) is the minimum number of
swapping required to make the attack successful and a meter
i with higher metric will be considered more secure means
the adversary need to swap several measurements to make the
swapping attack hidden. In equation (9), we optimize over all
re-ordering that lie under a threshold and its solution is |a∗|
that can be used to construct sparse attack. The constraint is to
limit the attacker to manipulate relatively closer measurements
where  is some arbitrary number. The sparse attack vector as a
result of optimization problem equation (9) can be formulated
as
a =
{
znewi − zoldi : zi /∈ Sm
0 : otherwise
where Sm denotes the set of secured measurements.
We now combine the intuitions attained for the above sce-
nario and propose Algorithm 1 to design the successful re-
ordering attack. Step 1 is the input for the adversary about
the knowledge of some previous plausible measurement vector
Mold. From steps 2-6, our attacker which is in fact a man-
in-the-middle receive all measurements from the sensors and
made Mnew. Steps 7-8 are the conditions for measurement
swapping, after which, attacker successfully create a swapped
Algorithm 1 Re-ordering Attack for scenario I
1: Inputs:
Mold = {z1, · · · zm}
2: Initialize:
hole← hole in array Mnew
zi ← measurement, i = 1, · · ·m
3: for t = 1 to length(M) do
4: zt ←M [t]
5: hole = t
6: Mnew[hole] = zt
7: while hole¿0 do
8: if |zi(new) − zi(old)| <  then zi(new) = zi(old)
9: else
10: end if
11: end while
12: end for
13: return Mnew
14: z =Mnew
15: Solve z = h(x) + e
16: Solve equation (7) for x
17: Calculate Mean Square Error (MSE)
measurement vector Mnew ready to use for state estimation.
The following arguments for the pre-condition prove its cor-
rectness: 1) The sufficient condition for the swapping attack to
be not affected by the traditional bad data detection is  < τ
and 2) As, for FDI attacks, a is defined to be non-zero entry
corresponding to the attacked measurements and zero for the
attacked ones. Similarly, for the re-ordering attack vector, as,
the two swapped readings will get corresponding non-zero
entries in a while un-swapped measurements will get zero in
a. Therefore, a necessary condition for a successful swapping
attack is same as that for stealth FDI attacks, i.e., the bad data
detection alarm is not triggered if a lies in the null-space of
I−K.
B. Scenario II
For this case, the model is same as for scenario I with
an additional constraint of a scalar multiple. This attack can
be regarded as a constrained injection or injection-swapping
attack. Here, to make the attack more effective, the adversary
swap the measurements with a scalar multiple of one of the
previous plausible data sets. The security metric defined in (9)
is appropriate to measure the minimum possible sparsity pat-
tern of the attack vector regardless of whether the magnitude
is high or low. However, it is also possible that some attack
vector may satisfy the sparsity criteria but instead due to large
magnitude, be caught in detection. Therefore, another metric
to keep the magnitudes of the swapping attack vector as low
as possible while making the attack successful is required.
minimize ‖znewi − zoldi ‖1
subject to |znewi − zoldi | < 
(10)
where the 1-norm of a vector v is ‖vi‖1 :=
∑ | vi | and 
is a predefined scalar which will limit the attacker to swap
relatively closer measurements.
The above problem is a convex optimization problem and
can be re-cast into a linear program. The solution of the re-
scaled problem can be used to obtain a∗ to achieve its goal
of adding bad data and remaining unnoticed at the same time.
The corresponding small magnitude swapping attack vector
obtained after solving the problem (10)
a =
{
znewi − d.zoldi : zi /∈ Sm
0 : otherwise
where d is an arbitrary scalar, ”.” represents element-wise
scalar multiplication and Sm is the set of protected measure-
ments as already defined.
V. NUMERICAL RESULTS
Before going into the detail of simulation results, it should
be recalled that to perform re-ordering attacks, the attacker
does not require the topology/subspace knowledge of the sys-
tem unlike already proposed attack strategies. In this section,
we discuss the performance of the above mentioned model
in constructing the re-ordering attacks in both scenarios by
simulations on IEEE 14 and 30-bus systems. It is worth men-
tioning here that for both scenarios discussed the following
two conditions hold: firstly, without any re-ordering, it only
takes 4 iterations till convergence and secondly, measurement
re-ordering attack is performed after each complete round of
WLS. The technique used to estimate the state is WLS and
MATPOWER is used for loading the data for AC model.
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Figure 3: Mean square error when re-ordering attack is per-
formed for scenario I with the same flat start for every round
of WLS
Mean square error (MSE) for performing re-ordering attacks
of the type described in scenario I, is illustrated in Fig. 3 for 14
and 30-bus systems while taking flat start for H . No reasonable
attack impact is seen till 40% of reading are swapped for both
the cases. However, afterwards, adequate increase in attack
impact when more than 40% of total measurements are re-
ordered can be seen. For all the cases of re-ordering, the state
estimation converges despite having false data except when
about more than 90% measurements are swapped in 14-bus
system. It can be observed that for larger systems, the impact
of swapping attack is higher as compared to 14-bus except
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Figure 4: Mean square error when re-ordering attack for
scenario I is performed with updated H for every round of
WLS
for the case when the state estimation diverges. It is worth
noting here that the case considered for this scenario is a
particular one and other cases may exist. In Fig. 5, mean
square error is shown when Jacobian matrix H from previous
round of WLS is used instead of flat start. This update affects
the attack by two means: 1) it is more practical and 2) error
propagation is even worse than that depicted in Fig. 3. Another
important difference is the convergence of both test systems
for every swapping unlike for scenario II having flat start for
Jacobian where 14-bus system diverges when all measurement
are re-ordered. But, the convergence rate becomes slow and
even dead when we re-order more than half of the total
measurements.
Case II i.e. swapping the measurements with some scalar
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Figure 5: Mean square error when re-ordering attack is per-
formed for scenario III
multiple of the respective readings in one of the preceding
plausible measurement vectors can be seen in Fig. 5 for both
14 and 30-bus systems. Here, cost of re-ordering attack or frac-
tion of measurements needed to be re-ordered is concerned,
attacker has to swap at least 62% of measurements to get the
maximum impact. It is worth mentioning here that there can
be other cases for scenario II as well, however only one of
them is discussed in which the scalar we are considering is
d = 3 and the convergence time/number of iterations increased
by the factor of 4 if compared with the no-attack case.
After examining all of the above simulation results, we can
infer that these swapping attacks are most appropriate even
when a part of the system is integrity- and confidentiality-
protected. Another aspect is that for larger systems, attacker
can achieve the error threshold with very low measurement
re-ordering (cost) as in Fig. 3 and Fig. 5.
VI. DISCUSSION
The measurement re-ordering attack as described in section
IV is made to work even if some parts of power system
are integrity protected. Key observation is that currently in
our power grid, the measurements are not authenticated time-
stamped to detect such re-ordering and such authentication
for detection purposes is adequately expensive to implement
atleast till near future. But, even assuming time-stamped
authentication, which is offered by ISO/IEC 62351 but not
widely deployed at present, re-ordering attacks may still
succeed when combined with message spoofing. This implies
that as long as there are old components in our power network,
there can be a chance of these kind of attacks. But, in ten
years time, cryptographically time-stamped authentication can
be made possible leaving the re-ordering attack less effective.
VII. CONCLUSION
We have introduced a new attack on power systems termed
as “re-ordering attacks”, where the adversary uses swapping
as a tool to change the order of data while not injecting or
modifying any data. Due to targeted re-ordering, it become
very difficult for the system operator to detect the source
of the error. Three cases for the attacker depending upon
the nature of swapping are discussed, and it is demonstrated
that, in all of the described cases, we can be successful in
achieving malicious goals i.e. state estimation converges for
both cases but with an adequate error and even divergence.
The significance of the presented attack lies in its applicability
despite modern protections.
Our ongoing research includes determining the impacts of
the re-ordering on hierarchical or distributed state estimation
which is more realistic in the smart grid. Other possible future
research includes answering how much and which particular
measurements should be swapped for the optimal swapping
attack.
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